Tag Archive for 'veritas'

Invincible Ideas?

In Invincible Ideas Richard argues that some propositions are ‘invincible’ because any attempt to defeat them is self defeating or “the act of opposition is itself an instance of what is being opposed.”

I find this line of reasoning very intriguing and at least ostensibly persuasive. Of course with Philosophy one is always very wary of an argument that concludes that its conclusion is indefeasible. Even in the case of apriori ‘truths’.

Take the example of argument. Can one successfully argue that argument is worthless? Don’t they commit the very sin they are railing against? Well, yes they do. Let’s replace argument with conflict, one can argue that conflict is worthless and what we really should be doing is cooperating with one another. But in the process of arguing this, you are going to be coming into conflict with people who do not share this view. Suppose you happen to convince everyone of this view, the conflict would consequently disappear and if things worked out, your argument might be validated.

Replace conflict back with argument again and suppose that we are now living in a world without arguments and it is much better for it. Doesn’t the fact that it required the proponents of the theory to argue for it, contradict the very thesis they are arguing for? Well, not really because the statement “all argument is worthless” is probably a misinterpretation of their thesis. And something along the lines of “the world would be better without argument” may be a more favourable interpretation.

The act of arguing for this thesis is itself a Wittgensteinian Ladder, to be climbed and then disposed of after you have reached its conclusion. I don’t think that we have to use the elements the thesis opposes to reach its conclusion automatically disqualifies the argument.

This shouldn’t be confused with obvious hypocrisy, such as “violence is absolutely wrong so I will kill anyone who is violent.” I think that is the key, is this idea of absolutes. If someone believes that conflict is absolutely wrong, then naturally if they are to act in accordance with that principle they must not conflict with other people, even to convince them of that principle.

The most famous example of this kind of self-referential fallacy is, “there is no truth.” One cannot affirm this statement is a truth without contradicting themselves. This causes many people to conclude that it is hence true that truths exist, this is to commit an either/or fallacy.

As a truth subjectivist, I am committed to the idea of “there is no truth” without affirming it as a truth. For if I am committed to this idea I must accept that it is possible that anything is true, even the possibility of there being truths.

Thus, perhaps there is no truth emerges.

People often respond that if nothing is true then why should I bother with your argument for that conclusion. But this is myopia, for they cannot see Wittgenstein’s Ladder leading them to a different point of view.

Consequently, I reject the notion that there philosophical ideas that are invincible to defeasibility whilst affirming the possibility of their existence.

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Common Sense?

In discussion over an engaging post about altruism by Richard over at Pixnaps he introduced an interesting point about common sense.

Richard: It involves rejecting our common-sense understanding of human action, and implies that we are engaged in massive self-deception.

IM: Definitely, why would you suppose that common-sense understanding of the human mind in reference to how we act just happens to be the best and most accurate model.

All else being equal, it counts against a theory if it is counter-intuitive. Similarly if it implies that most of our beliefs are false, that we are engaged in massive self-deception, etc. This isn’t a decisive objection, of course, but such uncharitibility does count against a theory. (The Brain-in-a-Vat hypothesis can account for all the data, but we reject it because it implies that all our common-sense beliefs are false. Simple realism is an alternative theory that serves much better in this regard. I have two hands, and I have other-regarding desires. We prefer theories that don’t contradict these core beliefs.) So the onus is on the theory’s proponent to show there is some advantage which makes this cost worth bearing.

I think that it is probably right in one sense that the counter-intuitive nature of a theory counts against a thoery but that this is outweighed by explanatory power.

The reason we develop theories is to grant an understanding of reality. If one theory gives an account of reality that confirms our common-sense beliefs and intuitions then it is far more palatable than one that requires us to reject our previously held notions and assumptions about the world and ourselves.

The danger here however is that because of its palatability we may search for theories to confirm our preconceived notions and ideas and our perspective may therefore skew.

Our aim and intent should always be to seek out those theories which grant the most explanatory power’. What does this mean? Well take the following passage from Shakespeare’s Macbeth:

Macbeth: Out, out, brief candle! Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player That struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more. It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing.

1. Now one interpretation could be that in this line Macbeth is describing an actor whose name is ‘Life’ and only had one hour playing a part upon the stage before loosing his voice forever.

2. Another is that it is referring to the fragility and absurdity of life, demonstrating Macbeth’s morose reaction to the news that Lady Macbeth has killed herself.

Now neither one of these interpretations/theories are any more valid than the other, they are both logical in the sense that they are semantically clear and follow from the original passage. What differs between them is their explanatory power, interpretation two is clearly far more powerful when considered in the context of the scene and the play and enables the reader to gain an intimate understanding of the character Macbeth. Interpretation two makes the reader why Macbeth would bring up such an irrelevant anecdote at a time like this.

Equally, Copernicus theory of the orbits of heavenly bodies in our galaxy granted far more explanatory power than the alternatives of his day even though it required people to suppose that they were victims of a massive self-deception at the hands of the Church who were convinced of the veracity of the account of Genesis.

The brain in the vat hypothesis may explain why some people appear to have advanced telekinetic capabilities but it disables us from understanding how we interact with reality and raises further questions of how we came to exist in vats. This is why we reject it, or at least this is why we should reject it.

Why should the counter-intuitive nature of a theory count against it? Not because of the effort involved in adjusting long-held intuitions, but because common sense holds a great deal of explanatory power.

I think that common sense intuitions are developed through an evolutionary biological manner. That if are brains are formed at the same time as our bodies it makes sense that we are intuitively attracted to features that happen to be indicators of health in our mates. It makes sense that we are intuitively fearful, or less empathetic with foreigners who look different from ourselves. It makes sense that we can easily conceive of the idea of ten things but not of a trillion things.

Along this view it would also make sense that our common sense grants us very simple ideas with great explanatory power but with no ability to discover the inner mechanics of reality that may link everything together. It makes sense that we are engaged in a massive self-deception because these intuitions are based upon the interface between an evolving primate and the world.

In this sense, I propose that counter-intuition does not detract from a theory at all. Whereas limited explanatory power and over-complexity does.

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I believe, not

I haven’t posted in awhile, primarily due to a judo injury that has caused me some discomfort. I was thrown (quite slowly) and as a result landed and rolled quite slowly over my right shoulder, during which I dislocated my AC joint.

In light of the recent Tsunami disaster there has been a lot of renewed discussion of how the notion of a good, omnipotent, interventionist god can be reconciled with natural disasters, or natural evil.

I took a philosophy of religion subject, during which I became a devout atheist, mostly because of the problem of evil. You see, if God were good then he wouldn’t want evil in the world (i.e. innocent people suffering) and if he is omnipotent (which traditional theists suppose he is) then he can prevent evil. If evil exists, then a good, omnipotent god does not.

In 1710, Leibniz invented the term “theodicy”. A theodicy is an argument that seeks to reconcile the existence of evil and god. The most compelling theodicy to my mind is the ‘free will’ theodicy, at least it was the one I was taught in school growing up as a catholic. That is, evil exists only as a product of human will, were god to prevent it he would remove a greater good, the good of free will.

What does this have to do with Tsunamis? Well in 1979 William L. Rowe published a paper in the American Philosophical Quarterly 16, called The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. He suggests the existence of ‘natural evils’ that is evils that exist without any connection to human free will. An earthquake occurs, triggering a Tsunami killing over a hundred thousand people, many woman and children. Unless living by the coast is a sin, these people would have been killed regardless of any wrong doing by people. These are evils that a good and omnipotent can and should prevent because the removal of which would pose no threat to the existence of free will.

If you find this argument compelling like I did, then you probably have reason to doubt the existence of god. Maybe you a cold hearted rationalist, maybe you had religion thrust upon you as a child and you have an affinity for rebellion. If you are unmoved by this argument then you are most likely a snooty philosopher with a better one or a person of faith. Maybe you have felt God in your heart or you have been taught to have faith no matter what tempts you. Regardless, at the end of the philosophy of religion subject I lost my atheism and found agnosticism, I saw that the people who walked into the first lecture held the same views at the last lecture. I saw that their beliefs were reinforced, no matter what. This is what this post is about.

I have spent a lot of time in philosophy forums debating evolutionary theory against creationists and debating God against theists. It was fun and I actually ruined a few people and became quite disgustingly arrogant and righteous in the process. Mostly though nothing changed. I pointed to flaws in their reasoning that I found compelling and they did the same, though more often than not they denied my reasoning by providing ‘evidence’ and sometimes counterexamples.

I later came to realise, (or at least suppose) that beliefs are self reinforcing. You arrive in the world empty, something happens and you construct a belief, you then seek for evidence to support your belief and so it happens that the world starts to emerge and look just as you imagine it would, because you play the principal role as editor, choosing what information you accept and how you filter your reality.

This is not a closed loop, people are able to change their minds, I know I have. But for the most part they don’t. My change of heart can be seen simply as constructing a new belief that contradicts old ones, that is a belief in scepticism, and a belief in open mindedness.

If you view beliefs in the way I have described it becomes quite difficult to have an open mind. How can you view other ideas, if it is from the vantage point of a reality constructed by opposing concepts. If you believe in truth, then you can never hope to find it if you are simply ‘locked in’ to the idea that you have held for most of your life.

I’m not specifically talking about God, this applies to every form of belief. Beliefs about human nature, about reality, about truth, about everything. I have come to believe in not having beliefs at all. Some people will read that and think that I have settled for some wimpy ‘it’s all to hard’ agnosticism and others may see some value in what I am writing. Depends on your vantage point, doesn’t it? Where you’ve come from.

A belief is a mental acceptance, a conviction in the truth of something. Once you have such a conviction about anything you are liable to be blind to the alternatives. However if you have a notion, idea or concept of something, you are unattached, unconvinced and open to the possibility of possibility.

If you combine this with the idea that truth is unattainable then you arrive first and foremost at the ‘fortasse’ the perhaps. The realm in which any theory is possible, and all that determines your reactions to them are your preconceptions. It is not easy, but I also freely admit that this notion may be completely wrong and the best thing to do is have beliefs. To be open minded, you must first doubt yourself. I think that perhaps this is where all philosophy starts, but then as you wander you find ideas you like and you can loose this, and so you have eternal debates of belief where each opponent is unwilling and unable to see the world from another vantage point. That reduces philosophy to a faith of logic.

So sneer if you will at those who are desperately trying to reconcile their beliefs about God with the suffering in the world today. Perhaps anyone who thinks they are in possession of the truth are the greatest fools of all and those who are prepared to doubt their convictions are those with courage.

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Too Many Possibilities?

Thanks for the comment by Richard to my previous post.

It is refreshing to see other thinkers asking the same sorts of questions, as evidenced in your post, So many Possibilities… , albeit in a more sophisticated way than myself.

Richard says that Some might equate metaphysical possibility with what people can imagine or conceive of. But conceivability merely tells us about the limits of human cognition, and doesn’t necessarily imply anything deeper about the possible nature of reality. I think this is quite right. You might suppose that it is a recurring flaw in human thinking. The way we interact with reality suggests that we think the way things are is the way things are and that is the way they will also be, even though the whole of history is a testament to the notion that all we can expect from the future is uncertainty and change.

It is a testament to the idea that it is possible that our cognitive abilities might expand, that it is possible that everything that has happened until this moment will have no bearing on the next. But still, we grasp onto the idea that we have uncovered truths that cannot be recovered, that we have somehow made progress in unravelling the shroud over reality.

Why should this be so? Because knowledge is constructed by eliminating possibility. If all explanations were possible and equally valid, then the law of gravity, the theory of relativity, and the whole body of logic would be lost among other possibilities attempting to explain the world away. It is metaphysically possible and logically possible that the red ball just so happens to move when the white ball hits it, but that it is not causally contingent. However we suppose that if we repeat the test a thousand times under the same conditions then we can accept causality as a best explanation and deny an alternative possibility.

Once you see that physical possibility and logical possibility are simply ‘best explanations’ we invented to be consistent with our method of thinking, the world starts to unravel. Why? Because all that is left is an idea of metaphysical possibility that is beyond our thinking, beyond our imagination or our conceptual grasp. In this context we can start to see how tenuous the idea of truth really is.

“Is it true that the red ball moved because of the white ball?” All explanations are possible, thus this is reduced to something more along the lines of “Is the best explanation that the red ball moved because of the white ball?” And this is laughable, because what constitutes a best explanation si subjective. It is subject to the person assessing the explanations’ thinking and context. If this persons knows this, and knows that the “best explanation” is simply that which is most consistent with our thinking and it is possible that the ‘true explanation’ lies in a metaphysical possibility beyond our grasp then there is no best explanation.

Truth like knowledge can only be constructed with a framework of strict limitations and boundaries.

1.Suppose an explanation that is beyond our ken is not a good one.
2.Suppose an explanation that violates other laws of physics is not a good one, unless it improves on an existing law.
3.Suppose an explanation that cannot be tested or observed is not a good one.
Etc.

Within this framework we can come up with knowledge and truth. Within the framework of arithmetic it is a undeniable fact that “1+1=2”, but as take away that framework and it becomes meaningless. There is meaningless abound when you consider that in the face of the possibility of possibility we have no good reason for accepting any limitations as true, or best explanation.

Richard said “I think it might be standard practice for philosophers to take logical impossibility as being genuinely (metaphysically) impossible”. I think this is quite right and applicable to academics of every field and discipline. In light of the fabrication of truth and knowledge there life’s work becomes a deck of cards sustained by a faith in some kind of realism and logic and the denial of what is possible. This is why some philosophers cannot accept that 1+1=2 could ever not be a universal and mind independent truth.

The argument has been, that this kind of scepticism is worthless, because it would inhibit knowledge and if accepted would lead everyone into a depressing solipsism. So the question then becomes, do we forget all this and “appeal to a pragmatic justification of some sort.”

Well I think that what following this line of thought actually does is open our minds considerably and could only further advance the cognitive capabilities of human beings by shedding previous conceptual limitations. The pitfall many fall into is in thinking that if something is “not true” it must be “false” this is binary thinking at its best, a product of classical logic.

But what if you accept the third category? The unknown.

Is it true that the red ball moved because of the white ball? No.
Is it false that the red ball moved because of the white ball? No.
It is unknown. We can come up with myriad explanations, but the “truth” in some objective reality is not as of yet accessible to us. All we have is the limitations of our thought which we impose and indeed construct for us our reality. A reality that is in fact a representation formed by our sensuous receptors.

So now we can know that we know nothing. How can we know this? We can’t. That is why it is Fortasse. This theory itself cannot be regarded as true because that would be self-contradictory (even though that is of course possible) and fall into the common relativist trap.

So perhaps we don’t really know anything and all we have is possibilities and we choose those explanations that have a greater explanatory power for their pragmatic function in assisting us in the development of possible knowledge.

So now, aren’t we left right back where we started? To some extent yes, but we have heaved off a giant conceptual limitation, with more to follow. If you have made it this far then you are on your way to open your mind and have it be free from inherited restriction.

If you have not, then you have questions and counterexamples. Excellent, write comments, this is apart of dialectical thinking, and I think Relativism of this kind can only be accepted as possible through this process, it is hard to accept a logical proof for the proof of the absurdity of proof.

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Logical Absurdity

So now we come to the absurdity of logical impossibility.

We would not think that those ideas beyond the comprehension of a platypus should have no possibility of existence. Why then would we think that a few million years of evolution would yield a piece of organic matter that was omniscient? That would be able to grasp all the truths possible in this universe or any other, and that anything that was “logically” nonsense must then be impossible?

It is arrogance of the highest level.

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Square Circles and other such Nonsense

Fortasse Veritam Non Est means “Perhaps Truth there’s not.” Or “Perhaps there is no truth”.

It is not a maxim upon which any certain conclusion can be drawn, because certainty there is not. Why? Because it does not claim that truth does not exist, it merely entertains that possibility.

Fortasse, is the key word, perhaps. To accept it means that something is possible, to deny it means that it is impossible. To say that it is possible that there is no truth is to say it is possible that anything is possible. That the realm of things that may be ‘true’ or existant is infinite in its capacity. The possibility of possibility itself.

Standard philosophical theory tells us that this is not the case, that there are well defined limits on what is possible. There is physical possibility, that which can coexist with the law’s of Earth physics. And logical possibility, that which can coexist with the laws of human logic.

It is no problem to entertain physical impossibilities because they simply need to be relocated to another planet, perhaps another universe. A heavy human walking on (liquid) water is considered impossible only because of our parochial attachment to the theorized physical barriers of this world.

There is not great intuitive leap in supposing that the world that we know is not the limit of the universe and to deny something’s existence in this world does not work to deny its existence at all.

This is not the case one we enter the realm of logical impossibility however. An object that is both a square and a circle at the same time cannot exist in any universe because it is contrary to itself, it violates simple logical laws. Intuitively this seems right, it simply makes no sense for the terms themselves are contradictory. These things lie outside the realm of human comprehension they are indeed nonsense.

It is interesting then that logical impossibilities are often used in Zen practices to prompt the student to reach Satori (enlightenment). To attain in the mind what is seemingly unattainable.

Can you yet see the same parochial attachment that is rampant in this distinction?

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Latin anyone?

I plan to expound a philosophical theory that I have crafted but by no means do I consider original nor unique. Yet. I have found that it is not easy to get a grasp of it all at once, especially seeing as it is not yet complete. So I will begin by propounding it’s essence:

Fortasse Veritam Non Est

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